Abstract. In this paper we investigate the relation between the axiomatization of a given logical consequence operation and axiom systems defining the class of algebras related to that consequence operation. We show examples which prove that, in general there are no natural relation between both ways of axiomatization.
Introduction
Most of the results presented in this paper are rather natural consequences of strong algebraic results achieved in the last few decades. The aim of this paper is to interpret some recent algebraic results and illustrate them by the unexpected properties of logical consequences determined by means of ortholattices.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between two different notions of the axiomatizability: L-axiomatizability and A-axiomatizability.
We will give precise definitions of these notions in the next section. Let's start however with the most important case -classical sentential logic.
It is well known that the classical logic can be axiomatized by means of the following Hilbert style proofs: P is provable from X (P ∈ C(X)) iff there are P 1 , . . . , P n such that P n = P , for 1 i n − 1, P i is a substitution of axiom, or P i ∈ X, or there are j, k ∈ {1, . . . , i} such that P k = ¬P j ∨ P i .
Axioms:
((p → (q → r)) → ((p → q) → (p → r)),
(p → ¬q) → (q → ¬p),
The axioms (L1)-(L11) determine the classical sentential logic. We will call them L-axioms. It is also well known that the classical logic can be semantically defined by means of the class of Boolean algebras. The classical sentential logic as well as the terms of Boolean algebras are expressed in the same language. Any sentence P of the classical sentential logic correspond in the natural way to the identity P = 1.
A very natural question arises: Given a logical consequence operation C determined in the way presented above by means of the set T of L-axioms. Let T 1 = {P = 1 : P ∈ T }. The set T 1 determines some class K (a variety) of algebras. We will say that T 1 form an A-axiom system for K. The class K determines semantically logical consequence operation Cn K in the following well known way. Thus if we consider any algebras A from K as a logical matrix A, {1} , where 1 is the unit element of A, then the logical consequence operation: P ∈ C(X) if and only if for any matrix of the from A, {1} , where A is a Boolean algebra and any valuation v if for any sentences Q from X, v(Q) = 1, then v(P ) = 1. medskip is a structural consequence operation.
One might have expected that C is equal to Cn K . The aim of this paper is to show that such an expectation is mistaken. C is different from Cn K even if C is the classical sentential logic.
Let Tc denote the set of L-axioms (L1)-(L11). They correspond in the sense presented above to the following set Tc 1 of A-axioms:
We will show that algebras satisfying the identities from Tc 1 don't need to be Boolean algebras.
Logics versus algebras
By S we mean a sentential langauge generated by the set Var = {p 1 , . . . , p n } of sentential variables and finite set of sentential connectives {F 1 , . . . , F n }. A sentential language is defined as absolutely free algebra. Thus a sentential language (as an absolutely free algebra) is an abstract algebra with the following property: For any algebra A, any function f : Var −→ A can be extended to homomorphism g : S −→ A.
All the examples of logical consequence operation considered in this paper are formulated in the language S 0 of classical sentential logic. Thus, the language S 0 has the connectives ∧, ∨, and ¬. Those connectives will not, in general, satisfy the properties of the classical connectives of conjunction, disjunction and negation. Although the connective of implication → plays an important role, we don't consider it as a primitive connective of the language S and will just consider a sentence P → Q as shorthand for ¬P ∨ Q.
The definition of the language as a free algebra has the advantage that there are no structural differences between a sentence of S, for example P ∧ ¬P and an element a ∧ a ′ of a given algebra. Although usually for sentences the symbol ¬P is used and for algebras we usually use the symbol a ′ , we understand that both of them have the same structure and mean a kind of complementation of a given sentence or of an element of a given algebra. In just this sense we are enabled to say about a given object P that it correspond to a sentence of S or to an element of given algebra.
Both the language S as well as any algebra with the same operations as S are the objects of the same type. For this very reason any sentence P ∈ S can be considered (to be precise: have an natural counterpart in) some element of a given algebra. Given a sentence γ of S. Then by γ A we denote the realization of γ in the algebra A. If the sentential variables p i and p j occurs in γ and a and b are the elements of some algebra A then γ(a, b) denotes the realization of γ in A.
We will often say that K is a set of sentences of the language S and at the same time that K is the set of elements of given algebra without giving more explanation.
The logical notion of substitution corresponds to the algebraic notion of homomorphism of the language S into itself. The logical notion of valuation corresponds to the notion of homomorphism of the language S into a given algebra. This allows us to use algebraic techniques and results for purely logical investigations.
By a logic we mean a structural consequence operation, i.e. a function:
, and closed with respect to substitutions, i.e. such that if P ∈ C(X) then any substitution of P belong to C(Y ), where Y is a set all respective substitutions of sentences from the set X. It is easy to check that any operation defined by means of Hilbert style proofs (also with any other axiom system than the one above) is a logic in the sense of the definition above.
By a logical matrix we mean a pair M = A, D where A is an abstract algebra and D is a subset of A-set of designated elements of M . By a valuations of S a matrix M we mean any homomorphism of the language S into the algebra A of the matrix M .
Every class of matrices K determines a function:
defined in the following way: P ∈ Cn K (X) if and only if for every matrix
It is easy to check that Cn K is a logic i.e., a structural consequence operation.
We use the symbol Cn for denoting a logic defined semantically, by means of some class of matrices while C (with indices if needed) is reserved for syntactic definitions (like Hilbert-style proofs) or for general considerations concerning logic as a structural consequence operation.
We say that a logic C is strongly complete relative to a semantics K for S, if C = Cn K . A semantics K is strongly adequate for a logic C if C is strongly complete relative to K.
Let C be a logic. For any X ⊆ S a matrix:
is called a Lindenbaum matrix for C. A class of matrices:
will be called a Lindenbaum bundle for C. One can show that any logic is strongly complete relative to the Lindenbaum bundle L C . To express it in more general way any logic is strongly complete with respect to some class of matrices. Given a logic C let Mod(C) denote the following set of matrices
One can prove that C is strongly complete with respect to Mod(C). For full references and a more detailed analysis of the theory of logical consequence we refer the reader to the monograph (Wójcicki 1987) . Given a set of sentences Z of the langauge S 0 , by C Z we mean the following consequence operation: P ∈ C Z (X) iff there are sentences P 1 , . . . , P n such that P n = P , for 1 i n − 1, P i is a substitution of some sentence from Z, or P i ∈ X, or there are j, k ∈ {1, . . . , i} such that P k = ¬P j ∨ P i .
We will say that a given structural consequence operation C is L-axiomatizable if and only if there exists a set of sentences Z such that C = C Z . The set Z will be called then L-axiom system for C.
Given a set T = {t i = u i : i ∈ I} where t i and u i are the sentences of the language S 0 . Let K denotes the class of all algebras satisfying for i ∈ I the condition t i = u i . We will then call T an A-axiom system for K. We will then also call K an A-axiomatizable class of algebras.
It is clear that not every class of algebras is A-axiomatizable. However, given a class K of algebras and the set T = {t i = u i : i ∈ I} of identities which are satisfied in all the algebras from K, then there exists the class of algebras V(K) which is A-axiomatizable by means of the set T . Using algebraic terminology, V(K) is the least variety containing the class K.
A technical notion important for this paper is the notion of matrix congruence. Given a logical matrix, we can paste some of its elements and then consider pasting classes as some independent objects -elements of some new logical matrix. The notion of matrix congruence and its properties tell us under what circumstances such a procedure leads us to-a logical matrix defining the same logical consequence.
Given a logical matrix M = A, D , a binary relation ≡ on A will be called a matrix congruence on M if and only if it is a congruence on A which doesn't paste together designated elements with non-designated ones. More precisely: ≡ is an equivalence relation on A which agrees with the operations on A and moreover a ≡ b and a ∈ D if and only if b ∈ D. For a given logical matrix M = A, D , and matrix congruence ≡ on A we can define the new factor matrix M ≡ . Its algebra and its set of designated elements consist of classes of equivalence of the elements of A with respect to ≡. Thus,
Let M = A, D be a matrix for S, v being a valuation S in M . For every p ∈ Var(S) and every a ∈ A we shall define on the set Var(S) a valuation v(a/p) of the language S into a matrix M as follows:
where q ranges over the set of all sentential variables of the language S. The following theorem gives the main properties of the matrix congruences: 
Then θ M ∈ Con(M ). Moreover, θ M is the greatest matrix congruence on A (in the sense of the relation of inclusion).
(c) Let S, C be a logic. Then for every X ⊆ S the greatest matrix congruence Ω S X on a Lindenbaum matrix L X = S, C(X) is defined as follows: for α, β ∈ S α θ X β if and only if for every φ ∈ S, every variable p ∈ Var(φ) we have φ(α/p) ∈ C(X) if and only if φ(β/p) ∈ C(X). 
Suppose that P ∈ C M/≡ (X), then for any valuation v :
(b) First we shall show, that θ M is a congruence on A. It is clear that θ M is an equivalence relation. Let # A be the interpretation of a m-ary connective # in A. Assume, that a θ M b. Let e 1 , . . . , e i , . . . , e m ∈ A. Denote:
. . , e i−1 , a, e i+1 , . . . , e m ),
We shall show that
Let φ ∈ S, p ∈ Var(φ) and v ∈ Hom(S, A). We have to prove, that
Assume, that Var(φ) = {p, q 1 , . . . , q n }. Consider the formula α = #(r 1 , . . . , r i−1 , p, r i+1 , . . . , r m ), where r 1 , . . . , r i−1 , r i+1 , . . . , r m are any sentential variables such that {r 1 , . . . , r i−1 , r i+1 , . . . , r m } ∩ Var(φ) = ∅. Let φ ′ be the sentence: φ(α/p), v ′ will then be a valuation into a matrix M such that:
e k when p = r k for a certain k ∈ {1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ..., m} v(q k ) when p = q k for a certain k ∈ {1, ..., n} arbitrary otherwise.
Now let us assume that c 1 θ M c 2 . Let p ∈ Var(S). Let v ∈ Hom(S, A). Let θ ∈ Con(M ). Assume, a θ b (where a, b ∈ A). We shall show that a θ M b. Let φ ∈ S, Var(φ) = {p, q 1 , . . . , q n } and let v ∈ Hom(S, A). We denote: Corollary 2.2. Let S, C be a logic. Then for every X ⊆ S the greatest matrix congruence θ X on a Lindenbaum matrix L X = S, C(X) is defined as follows: for α, β ∈ S, α θ X β if and only if for every φ ∈ S, every variable p ∈ Var(φ) we have φ(α/p) ∈ C(X) if and only if φ(β/p) ∈ C(X). For a matrix M we will use the symbol θ M to denote the greatest matrix congruence on M . We shall call a matrix M simple if and only if θ M is an identity relation. In a simple matrix the identity is the only matrix congruence. Let S, C be a logic. Then the class of all simple matrices from the class Mod(C) will be denoted by Mod ⋆ (C). It is a immediate consequence of a) that C is strongly complete with respect to Mod ⋆ (C).
Let M = A, D and N = B, E be similar matrices. The matrix M will be called a submatrix of the matrix N , in symbols M ⊆ N , if A is a subalgebra of the algebra B and D = A ∩ E.
A logic C is called equivalential (finitely equivalential) if there exists a set (a finite set, resp.) E(p, q) of sentences of the language S, in which two variables occur and such that for any sentences P , Q, φ, any variable p occurring in φ and any sentences the following conditions hold:
The set E(α, β) is called a a system of equivalence sentences for C, or C-equivalence for short.
The above definition is due to (Prucnal and Wroński 1974) . Czelakowski 2001 is a monograph on the subject of equivalential logic.
Theorem 2.4. Every equivalence E(p, q) for C satisfies the following conditions for any P , Q, R, and any n-ary connective f and any sentences P 1 , . . . ,
Directly from the definition one can show that if C ′ is stronger than C than C-equivalence (if it exists) is also a C ′ -equivalence.
Theorem 2.5. (a) Let E(p, q) be an equivalence for C. Then for any reduced C-matrix M = A, D the greatest matrix congruence θM on M is equal to the following relation ≡ E (D):
Proof. (a) It is easy to show that ≡ E is a matrix congruence on A, D . To finish the proof it is then enough to show that ≡ E is greatest or equal to the greatest matrix congruence θ M on M . Take any a, b ∈ A such that a θ M b. According to Theorem 2.1b for every
The formula E(a, b) ⊆ D will be used as a shorthand for the following formula:
Thus for any matrix A, D we have:
Since N is simple then ≡ E is the identity relation and then a ≡ D b is identity relation. Hence, M is simple.
Remark 2.6. The proof above is based on the following formula
where ≡ determines the greatest congruence on any C-matrix for a given equivalential logic C. So, ≡ D and ≡ E are just the greatest matrix congruences respectively on M and N . Let us note however that if we replace ≡ D by the greatest congruence θ M on M then the resulting formula
is not always true (see Example 3.3).
The notion of an implicative logic was introduced by Rasiowa in (1974) . A logic C is called implicative if there exists a sentence σ(p, q) ∈ S such that Var(σ(p, q)) = {p, q} and for any sentences α, β, γ, φ ∈ S and any variable p ∈ Var(φ) the following conditions are satisfied:
It is an obvious consequence of definitions that every implicative logic is equivalential. Moreover, if σ(p, q) is an implication for C then {σ(p, q), σ(q, p)} is a C-equivalence.
A class of matrices K is called an algebraic semantics if the set of distinguished elements of every matrix from the class K is one-element. We say that a logic S, C has an algebraic semantics if it has a strongly adequate algebraic semantics.
Theorem 2.7 (Suszko). For a logic S, C fulfilling the condition C(∅) = ∅ to have an algebraic semantics it is necessary and sufficient that the following rule is a rule of C:
where α, β, φ ∈ S. In consequence, every strengthening of a logic with an algebraic semantics has an algebraic semantics.
Proof. Assume that C has an algebraic semantics K. Let A, {1}) ∈ K and let v : S −→ A be any valuation such that
So, the rule (⋆) is a rule for C.
Orthologic -a couple examples
By an ortholattice we mean an algebra in A, ∧, ∨, ′ with two binary operators ∧ and ∨ and one unary operation ′ such that A, ∧, ∨ which is a bounded lattice i.e. a lattice with the greatest and the smallest elements 1 and 0 satisfying the following conditions:
It is worth mentioning that the last condition is equivalent to either of the following two:
If moreover for x ≤ y, we have y ∨ (y ′ ∧ x) = x, then A is called an orthomodular lattice. The class of all ortholattices as well as the class of all orthomodular lattices are equationally definable-they constitute varieties which we shall denote by OL and OML, respectively.
The set of all sentences P of S 0 such that the realization P A of P in an ortholattice A satisfies the condition P A = 1 will be called the content of A and denoted by E(A). By the content E(A) of a class K of ortholattices we mean the meet of contents of elements of K. Thus E(OL) (respectively r r r r
The logic Cn OL in the language S = S, ∧, ∨, ′ has an algebraic semantics, hence any strengthening of it has accordingly to Theorem 2.7, an algebraic semantics. Any strengthening of the logic Cn OL (Cn OML respectively) will be called an orthologic (orthomodular logic, respectively) Theorem 3.1. If an ortholattice A is not orthomodular, then it contains as a sublattice the ortholattice B 6 from the picture above.
Proof. Since A is not orthomodular then there exist x, y ∈ A such that:
It is easy to see that x = y and hence
It is easy to check that the set {1, 0, a, b, a ′ , b ′ } is the universe of the lattice isomorphic to B 6 .
Theorem 3.2. Let C be an orthologic. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) C is an orthomodular logic.
(ii) C is an implicative logic.
(iii) C is an finitely equivalential logic.
(iv) C is an equivalential logic.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Consider the following terms in two variables x, y:
Kotas (1967) (see also (Kalmbach 1983) ) proved that the terms p 1 , . . . , p 5 are the only terms having the property that for any orthomodular lattice A and any a, b ∈ A, p(a, b) = 1 if and only if a ≤ b. As a consequence, the logic Cn OML is implicative and each of (and only for) the following implication connectives:
is its implication. As a consequence, every orthomodular logic is implicative. The implications (ii) ⇒ (iii) and (iii) ⇒ (iv) are obvious. (iv) ⇒ (i) We will show that if C is an orthologic which is not orthomodular, then C is not equivalential. Thus, Let K be an algebraic semantics for C. Put:
where θ A is the greatest matrix congruence in the matrix A, {1} . Surely, for A ∈ K ⋆ the matrix A, {1} is simple; moreover in accordance with Theorem 2.1a we have:
C is not an orthomodular logic, so there exists an algebra A ∈ K ⋆ which is not orthomodular. From theorem (3.1) the ortholattice B 6 is a subalgebra of the algebra A. Consequently the matrix (B 6 , {1}) is a submatrix of the matrix (A, {1}). However the matrix (B 6 , {1}) is not simple since the principal congruence θ(a, b) is a matrix congruence. Consequently the class Mod ⋆ (C) is not closed under the submatrices operation and hence from Theorem 2.5b C is not equivalential.
Theorem 3.3. For any L-axiom system T = {P i : i ∈ I} for classical logic the set T 1 = {P i = 1 : i ∈ I} is not an A-axiom system for the class of Boolean Algebras.
Proof. Let M denote the matrix M = B 6 , {1} . The binary relation on B 6 ≡ = {(a, b), (a ′ , b ′ )} is a matrix congruence. Let N = M/ ≡ then N = A, {1} where A is just the four-element Boolean algebra. Obviously Cn N is the classical logic. Then, by Theorem 2.1a, Cn M is the classical logic. Let T = {P i : i ∈ I} denotes any L-axiom system for (classical logic) Cn M . Then all the identities from the set T 1 = {P i = 1 : i ∈ I} are satisfied in M . On the other hand M is non-distributive and hence it is not a Boolean algebra.
To end let us consider an example illustrating Theorem 2.5 and Remark 2.7.
Remark 3.4. Lets consider the logic determined by the matrix M = (B 6 , {1, a}). It is easy to check that the only non-trivial congruence on B 6 pastes together a and b, and this is not matrix congruence and hence M is simple. Let A denote the sublattice of B 6 generated by the set {1, a, b, 0}. It is clear that N = A, {1, a}) is a submatrix of M . However it is not simple. The greatest matrix congruence on N paste together a and 1 and also b and 0. For matrices M and N the formula (⋆⋆) from the Remark 2.6 fails because we have θ M = id = {(a, 1), (b, 0)} = (A × A) ∩ {(a, 1), (b, 0)} = (A × A) ∩ θ N . It proves that: (a) the formula (⋆⋆) doesn't need to be valid if the greatest matrix congruence θ M on M is not definable by means of an equivalence system, (b) the logic determined by M is not equivalential.
